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There has been an upswing of interest in eco-
nomics and the media over the decline in the 
share of GDP going to labor. The stability of 
the labor share of GDP was one of the famous 
Kaldor (1961) “stylized facts” of growth. The 
macro stability of labor’s share was always, as 
Keynes remarked, “something of a miracle” and 
disguised instability at the industry level (Elsby, 
Hobijn, and Sahin 2013). Karabarbounis and 
Neiman (2014) emphasize that the decline in the 
labor share is not confined to the United States 
and occurs primarily within rather than between 
industries. Although there is controversy over 
the degree to which the fall in the labor share is 
due to measurement issues such as the treatment 
of housing (Rognlie 2015) and intangible capi-
tal (Koh, Santaeulàlia-Llopis, and Zheng 2016), 
there is consensus that there has been a decline 
in the US labor share since the 1980s, particu-
larly in the 2000s.
Nevertheless, little consensus exists on the 
causes of the decline in the labor share. Elsby, 
Hobijn, and Sahin (2013) argue for the impor-
tance of international trade and find that the labor 
share declines the most in US industries strongly 
affected by import shocks. However, labor 
shares have also declined in most  nontraded 
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 sectors such as wholesale, retail, and utilities, a 
pattern not readily explained by rising trade.
Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) instead 
emphasize that the cost of capital has fallen rel-
ative to the cost of labor, driven especially by 
rapid declines in quality-adjusted equipment 
prices of information and communication tech-
nologies. A decline in the relative price of capi-
tal will lead to a decline in the labor share under 
CES production functions if the capital-labor 
elasticity of substitution is greater than unity. 
Although Karabarbounis and Neiman present 
evidence that the elasticity exceeds unity, the 
bulk of the empirical literature suggests a much 
lower elasticity (e.g., Lawrence 2015). Since 
changes in relative factor prices tend to be simi-
lar across firms, lower elasticity, i.e. below unity, 
lower relative equipment prices should lead to 
greater capital adoption and falling labor shares 
in all firms. In Autor et al. (2017) we find the 
opposite: the unweighted mean labor share 
across firms has not decreased much since 1982. 
Thus, the average firm shows little decline in its 
labor share. To explain the decline in the aggre-
gate labor share, one must study the reallocation 
of activity among heterogeneous firms toward 
firms with low and declining labor shares.
In Autor et al. (2017) we propose a new 
superstar firm model that emphasizes the role of 
firm heterogeneity in the dynamics of the aggre-
gate labor share. We hypothesize that industries 
are increasingly characterized by a “winner 
take most” feature where one firm (or a small 
number of firms) can gain a very large share 
of the market. Large firms have lower labor 
shares if production requires a fixed amount 
of overhead labor in addition to a size-depen-
dent variable labor input, or if markups in the 
product market correlate positively with firm 
size. Possible explanations for the growth of 
winner take most include the diffusion of new 
competitive platforms (e.g., easier price/quality 
comparisons on the Internet), the proliferation 
of  information-intensive goods that have high 
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fixed and low marginal costs (e.g., software 
platforms and online services), or increasing 
competition due to the rising international inte-
gration of product markets. New technologies 
may also have strengthened network effects and 
favored firms that are more adept at adopting 
and exploiting new modes of production.
This paper exposits and evaluates two core 
claims of the superstar firm explanation: (i) 
the concentration of sales among firms within 
an industry should rise across much of the US 
private economy; and (ii) industries with larger 
increases in concentration should experience a 
larger decline in labor’s share.
I. Model
To see the intuition for a link between the 
rise of superstar firms and a decline in the 
labor share, consider a production function 
 Y = A V  α L   K 1−α L where  Y is value-added,  V is 
variable labor,  K is capital, and  A is  Hicks-neutral 
efficiency ( TFPQ), which we assume is hetero-
geneous across firms. There is a fixed amount 
of overhead labor  F   needed for production, so 
total labor is  L = V + F. We assume that factor 
markets are competitive with wage  w and cost of 
capital  r being equal to the input factors’ mar-
ginal revenue products, while there is imper-
fect competition in the product market. From 
the static first-order condition for labor, we can 
write the share of labor costs ( wL ) in nominal 
value-added ( PY ) as
(1)   S i =  ( wL ___PY) i =  
 α L  ___ μ i  +  wF _____  (PY) i ,
where  μ is the markup, the ratio of product 
price ( P ) to marginal cost ( c ), and  F is fixed 
overhead labor costs. The firm subscripts  i indi-
cate that for given economy-wide values of ( α L , w, F ), a firm will have a lower labor share 
if (i) its share of fixed costs in total revenues 
is lower or (ii) its markup is higher. Superstar 
firms (firms with high  A i ) will be larger because 
they produce more efficiently and capture a 
higher share of industry output. Superstar firms 
therefore will have a lower share of fixed costs 
in total revenues, and thus a lower labor share. 
In monopolistically competitive models, the 
markup is the same across firms in an indus-
try:  μ = ρ / (ρ − 1) , where  ρ is the price elas-
ticity of demand. However, in other models of 
imperfect competition, firms with larger market 
shares will be able to set higher markups (e.g., 
Cournot competition), also leading to a negative 
relationship between firm size and labor shares. 
In either case, when there is an exogenous 
change that allocates more market share to a 
small number of large superstar firms, the aggre-
gate labor share will fall as the economy shifts 
toward these low labor share firms. Autor et al. (2017) formalize this idea in a simple superstar 
firm model for a monopolistically competitive 
setting. Distinct from the prior literature, the 
superstar firm model emphasizes the heteroge-
neity of firms within industries as being critical 
for understanding the fall in the labor share. We 
next show that, in line with the model’s mech-
anism, the concentration of sales across firms 
within industries has grown in most US sectors.
II. Data and Empirical Findings
We use data from the US economic census, 
conducted every five years to enumerate all 
establishments in select sectors on current eco-
nomic activity. We focus on the economic census 
from 1982 to 2012 for six large sectors: manu-
facturing, retail trade, wholesale trade, services, 
finance, and utilities and transportation. The cov-
ered establishments in these six sectors account 
for four-fifths of total private sector employment.
For the six sectors, the census reports each 
establishment’s annual payroll, output, employ-
ment, and an identifier for the firm to which 
the establishment belongs. To measure the con-
centration of sales within an industry, we use 
an output measure capturing total sales by the 
establishment during the survey year. To mea-
sure sales at the firm level, we aggregate the sales 
of all establishments that belong to the same firm 
and the same industry. If a firm operates estab-
lishments in several industries, each combina-
tion of firm and industry is counted as a separate 
firm, capturing the firm’s separate contributions 
to sales concentration in several industries.
To implement our industry-level analysis, we 
assign each establishment in a given year to a 
1987 SIC-based time-consistent industry code 
as described in Autor et al. (2017). Our meth-
odology yields 676 industries, 388 of which 
are in manufacturing. All of our measures use 
these time-consistent industry definitions lead-
ing to measures of industry concentration that 
differ slightly from published statistics. The 
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 correlation between our calculated measures 
and those based on the published data is close 
to one, however, for periods without changes in 
industry definitions.
We measure the concentration of sales within 
an industry as either the fraction of total sales 
accruing to its four largest firms (denoted CR4) 
or the fraction of sales accruing to its 20 largest 
firms (denoted CR20). Figure 1 plots the aver-
age CR4 and CR20 across four-digit industries 
for our six sectors from 1982 to 2012. The level 
of sales concentration varies considerably across 
sectors. In each year, the top four firms in an 
average manufacturing industry capture more 
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Figure 1. Average Top 4 Industry Concentration by Major Industry Group
Notes: This figure plots the average concentration ratio in six major sectors of the US economy. Industry concentration is 
calculated for each time-consistent four-digit industry code as described in Autor et al. (2017), and then averaged across all 
industries within each of the six sectors. The solid line with circles, plotted on the left axis, shows the average fraction of total 
industry sales that is accounted for by the largest four firms in that industry, and the solid line with triangles, also plotted on 
the left axis, shows the average fraction of industry employment utilized in the four largest firms in the industry. Similarly, the 
dashed line with circles, plotted on the right axis, shows the average fraction of total industry sales that is accounted for by the 
largest 20 firms in that industry, and the dashed line with triangles, also plotted on the right axis, shows the average fraction of 
industry employment utilized in the 20 largest firms in the industry. Data for the financial sector in panel B and for utilities and 
transportation in panel D are available only since 1992.
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than one-third of the industry’s total sales, while 
the top four firms in the average service industry 
combine for less than one-sixth of total sales.
There is a remarkably consistent upward trend 
in concentration in each sector. In manufactur-
ing, the sales concentration ratio among the top 
four increases from 38 percent to 43 percent; in 
finance, it rises from 24 percent to 35 percent; in 
services from 11 percent to 15 percent; in utili-
ties from 29 percent to 37 percent; in retail trade 
from 15 percent to 30 percent; and in whole-
sale trade from 22 percent to 28 percent. Over 
the same period, there were similar or larger 
increases in CR20 for sales.
To further characterize the emergence of 
superstar firms, Figure 1 also plots CR4 and 
CR20 concentration measures based on firm 
employment rather than sales. Again, we observe 
a rise in concentration in all six sectors for 1982 
to 2012, although employment concentration 
has grown notably more slowly than sales con-
centration in finance, services, and especially in 
manufacturing. The pattern suggests that firms 
may attain large market shares with a relatively 
small workforce, as exemplified by Facebook 
and Google.
In Autor et al. (2017) we show that the two 
main qualitative findings of Figure 1 are robust 
to the use of an industry’s Herfindahl-Hirschman 
index (HHI). Sales have become more concen-
trated in each of the six broad sectors of the US 
economy.
A measurement challenge for our finding 
of rising concentration for broad US sectors is 
that our concentration measures are calculated 
exclusively using US-based establishments. 
Thus, our measures include production by for-
eign multinationals operating in the United 
States, but they exclude imports. A measure 
that includes only the market shares of US 
producers may mischaracterize concentration 
trends given rising import shares, particularly 
for manufacturing.
We assess the importance of trade in the com-
petitive structure of manufacturing by calcu-
lating import-adjusted concentration ratios that 
treat imports from major country groups as if 
they belong to a single firm. Figure 2 plots the 
import-adjusted CR4 and CR20 measures along 
with the original measures only for US-based 
establishments. The series with and with-
out trade adjustment track each other closely, 
reaffirming our main finding of rising sales 
 concentration. The slightly higher level of the 
adjusted concentration ratios implies that for-
eign producers (such as China) account for a 
sizable fraction of sales in some manufactur-
ing industries. Imports in such industries likely 
originate from a small number of major foreign 
firms, but our data do not permit a firm-level 
breakdown of imports.
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Figure 2. Industry Concentration Adding Imports
Notes: This figure plots the average sales concentration in 
US four-digit manufacturing industries from 1992 to 2012. 
The line with triangular markers the average fraction of total 
sales by domestic firms that is accounted for by an indus-
try’s four largest firms (corresponding to the CR4 Sales data 
series in the top left panel of Figure 1). The line with squares 
markers the fraction of the total US market, defined as sales 
by domestic firms plus industry imports, which is produced 
by an industry’s four largest “firms”, where each group of 
exporting countries is counted as an individual firm. Imports 
are based on UN Comtrade data as described in Autor et al. 
(2017), and the six country groups are: Canada, Mexico/
CAFTA, China, low-income countries except China, 
eight developed countries (Australia, Denmark, Finland, 
Germany, Japan, New Zealand, Spain, and Switzerland), 
and rest of the world. On average, 0.94 country groups are 
among the top four firms in panel A, and 2.7 country groups 
are among the top 20 firms in panel B.
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A further implication of our superstar firm 
model is that the labor share should fall differ-
entially in industries that are experiencing larger 
increases in concentration. Intuitively, the causal 
force in our model is the shift in competitive 
conditions, which reallocates market share to 
larger and more productive firms. Indeed, Autor 
et al. (2017) document a strong negative rela-
tionship in the cross section between a firm’s 
market share and its labor share. Thus, rising 
concentration and falling labor shares should 
move in tandem, both in aggregate and between 
industries.
Autor et al. (2017) test this implication by 
estimating bivariate regressions of five-year 
changes in the payroll share of value-added on 
the contemporaneous change in concentration 
for the 388 manufacturing industries for the 
years 1987–2012. Figure 3 (sourced from Autor 
et al. 2017) summarizes these regressions. In 
the initial five years of our sample, we detect no 
significant cross-industry relationship between 
rising concentration and falling labor share. But 
the cross-industry relationship between rising 
concentration and falling labor share becomes 
negative and significant in the next five-year 
interval, and grows in absolute magnitude across 
each subsequent interval. In the final period from 
2007 to 2012, we estimate that each percentage 
point rise in an industry’s CR20 concentration 
index predicts a 0.4 percentage point fall in its 
labor share. We also observe a similar negative 
relationship between changes in the share of 
labor in sales and concentration in all six sectors.
Why has industry sales concentration 
increased? One set of explanations involves 
a technological change that has made markets 
increasingly “winner take most” so that super-
star firms with higher productivity increasingly 
capture a larger slice of the market. Or if incum-
bents are more likely to innovate and the per-
sistence of incumbent’s innovative advantage 
has risen (Acemoglu and Hildebrand 2017), 
the incumbent advantage would increase and so 
would incumbents’ market shares.
An alternative set of explanations posits that 
higher concentration could arise from anticom-
petitive forces whereby dominant firms are 
increasingly able to prevent actual and poten-
tial rivals from entering and expanding (Barkai 
2016). For instance, firms may lobby for regu-
latory barriers that complicate market entry/
expansion for new and small firms. Higher entry 
barriers would enable incumbents to have higher 
monopolistic rents and therefore lower the labor 
share.
In the first set of explanations, the industries 
becoming increasingly concentrated will tend to 
be more dynamic with higher productivity and 
technical change. By contrast, in the second set 
of explanations, the concentrating industries are 
likely to be dominated by less productive and 
less dynamic incumbents.
To shed light on these alternatives, we explored 
the relationship between changes in concentra-
tion and changes in other industry character-
istics. Data limitations restrict this analysis to 
manufacturing. We find that the industries that 
became more concentrated over our sample 
period were also the industries in which produc-
tivity—measured by either output per worker, 
value-added per worker, TFP, or patents per 
worker—increased the most. Interestingly, there 
is no strong relationship between the change in 
concentration and the change in average wages. 
The findings suggest that a positive productiv-
ity-concentration relationship will most likely 
feature in any plausible explanation of rising 
industry concentration.
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Figure 3. Correlation between Changes in Labor 
Share and Changes in Industry Concentration in the 
US Manufacturing Sector at Five-Year Intervals, 
1982–1987 through 2007–2012
Notes: This figure plots point estimates and 95 percent con-
fidence intervals from Autor et al. (2017) for ordinary least 
squares bivariate regressions of the change in the payroll to 
value-added share on the change in the CR20 index and a 
constant, estimated at the level of four-digit US manufac-
turing industries and separately for each of the indicated 
five-year intervals. Regressions are weighted by industries’ 
shares of  value-added in 1982.
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III. Conclusions
We have considered a superstar firm expla-
nation for the much-discussed fall in labor share 
of GDP. Our hypothesis is that technology or 
market conditions—or their interaction—have 
evolved to increasingly concentrate sales among 
firms with superior products or higher productiv-
ity, thereby enabling the most successful firms 
to control a larger market share. Because these 
superstar firms are more profitable, they will have 
a smaller share of labor income in total sales or 
value-added. Consequently, the aggregate share 
of labor falls as the weight of superstar firms in 
the economy grows. The model yields many pre-
dictions that are elaborated and tested in Autor et 
al. (2017). A key underpinning of the superstar 
firm explanation for declining labor share is that 
sales should become increasingly concentrated 
in a small number of firms across a wide range 
of industries. Consistent with the model, we find 
that the concentration of sales (and of employ-
ment) has indeed risen from 1982 to 2012 in each 
of the six major sectors covered by the US eco-
nomic census. In Autor et al. (2017), we further 
show that those industries where concentration 
rises the most have the sharpest falls in the labor 
share, and that the fall in the labor share is mainly 
due to a reallocation of labor toward firms with 
lower (and declining) labor shares, rather than 
due to declining labor shares within most firms.
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